Understanding Warfare and World War 3.0

1. Redefining World War

• Traditional views of World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) may be too narrow to define modern global conflict.

  • Example: WWII didn’t begin in 1939 but arguably in 1937 with Japan’s invasion of China, not as a standalone Sino-Japanese War but as Phase 1 of a broader global war.

  • Similarly, the Austro-Serbian conflict of 1914 was a slow start to WWI.

• A world war doesn’t require the scale of carnage seen in the 20th century to qualify as such. The platonic ideal of "absolute war"—unrestrained, merciless conflict—differs from "limited war," which is characterized by constraint.

• Total war (lacking constraint) contrasts with the assumption that heavy warfare won’t return to European soil, with future conflicts expected to be insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.

2. Are We Already in World War 3.0?

• The world is not at peace—current conflicts resemble a global war but don’t fit neatly into 20th-century templates.

• Rather than preparing to fight the "last war" (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan), we must examine today’s conflicts—Russia-Ukraine, Iran’s proxies, North Korea’s involvement—for signs of a broader "WW 3.0."

• Key question: Are we fighting a series of limited wars globally, or is this a cohesive, escalating world war?

3. The Remarkable Trinity of Warfare

• Clausewitz’s trinity—reason (rationale for fighting), passion (public arousal for war), and chance (uncertainty in military operations)—remains critical.

• Applied to today:

  • Reason: National interests drive states like Russia to pursue conflict (e.g., Ukraine, disrupting NATO cohesion).

  • Passion: Mobilization efforts (e.g., Russia tapping its population and prisons, Ukraine’s conscription debates) reflect attempts to arouse support.

  • Chance: Unpredictability persists in multi-domain operations (kinetic, cyber, information).

Current Conflicts and Their Global Implications

4. Russia’s Role and Total War Characteristics

• Russia exhibits traits of total war:

  • Deep mobilization of its armed forces, prison population, and quasi-national forces.

  • Wartime economy and alignment with Iran and North Korea, nations historically viewing themselves as perpetually at war.

  • Russian doctrine integrates kinetic, information, and cyber domains seamlessly—disrupting NATO cohesion is a strategic priority.

• Examples of escalation:

  • North Korean conscripts in Russian operations.

  • Iranian proxies in the Middle East and Russian facilities in Syria suggest a spreading conflict.

5. Ukraine and Limited Mobilization

• Ukraine has mobilized widely but not fully (e.g., sparing its youngest population).

• European discussions about sending professional soldiers beyond training roles hint at a shift from regional to broader involvement.

6. Multi-Domain Warfare

• WW 3.0 spans traditional domains (land, sea, air) and new ones (cyber, information).

• Russia’s pre-Ukraine War "shaping operations" in the information domain targeted Western democracies, disrupting liberal consensus and NATO unity.

• Contrast: Western hesitance (e.g., U.S. psyops stop at its borders) leaves it vulnerable to Russian botnets and disinformation campaigns active for 10–15 years.

7. Cyber Warfare’s Role

• Cyber war is real but not limited to attacking critical infrastructure (e.g., pacemakers or power grids).

• Russia’s approach: Softer targets—political, cultural, social cohesion—via cybernetic and social engineering (e.g., Brexit, Cambridge Analytica).

• Argument: Kinetic force isn’t required for "war"—disruption of societal consensus can be just as effective.

Mobilization and Societal Impact

8. Mobilization for WW 3.0

• What does mobilization look like today?

  • Russia: Forced conscription and economic reorientation.

  • Ukraine: Conscription debates (e.g., Zelenskyy’s controversy).

  • Europe: Germany debates reintroducing conscription to counter Russia, but training costs (e.g., £50,000 per British soldier) compete with equipment needs (e.g., Britain’s 148 tanks).

• Mobilizing individuals may cancel out other priorities (e.g., advanced systems, armored vehicles).

9. Passion and Public Support

• Historical U.S. examples (e.g., Vietnam) show conscription without public passion leads to resistance.

• Russia taps into nationalistic fervor, while Western democracies struggle to justify existential wars.

Potential Escalation and Strategic Considerations

10. Threat of Escalation

• Scenarios like Russia detonating a nuclear device over the Baltic Sea to deter Ukraine’s supporters remain speculative but highlight the stakes.

• Romania’s fears of Russian influence (e.g., returning to Soviet-style governance) reflect broader Eastern European anxieties.

11. Centers of Gravity in WW 3.0

• Clausewitz’s three ideal targets:

  • Enemy capital (economic sinews of war).

  • Rational capability (leadership).

  • Army (operational capability).

• Modern adversaries likely prioritize disrupting Western operational capabilities first (e.g., NATO cohesion, U.S.-Canada ties), then target rational and economic systems.

12. Russia’s Endgame

• Russia seeks to disrupt NATO’s economic and social cohesion, aligning with Iran, Yemen, and others to spread conflict (e.g., Middle East proxies, Syria).

• Success hinges on fracturing Western alliances, a decades-long doctrinal goal.

Conclusion: WW 3.0 in Progress?

• Evidence suggests a shift from regional conflicts to a broader, multi-domain war resembling total war.

• Unlike WWII, WW 3.0 doesn’t require mass carnage—it’s already unfolding through cyber, information, and limited kinetic operations.

• The U.S. risks becoming an "arsenal of autocracy" if it shifts alignment, supplying enemies rather than allies.

• Incumbent on analysts to recognize this evolution, assess policies maturely, and respond with ruthless determination to counter disruptions—because WW 3.0 may already be here.